Средний турок обычно женат, но кроме жены у него есть еще возлюбленная на стороне. Он никогда не захочет вляпаться в неприятность; ему ненавистна сама ситуация, когда необходимо принимать решение о выборе между этими двумя женщинами. Отсюда у подавляющего большинства турок наличие любовницы есть факт, твердо внедрившийся в сознание. Турецкий мужчина изменяет жене, к которой он остыл, но согласно общепринятым представлениям в обществе такие его действия не считаются изменой, ибо это некий стиль или образ жизни, не противоречащий обществу и устоявшемуся порядку вещей. Подобное понимание распространено и среди женщин. Типичный турок дома ходит в пижаме или в спортивном трико. Свой дом он считает комфортным и уютным местом, которое он никогда не принесет в жертву чему бы то ни было. Свой дом и семью он не променяет ни на какую любовь и ни на какой идеал. Для него очень важны сохранение и укрепление привязанности к устоявшимся привычкам. Предпочитает женщин, не подавляющих его мужское “эго” и не утомляющих его. По этой причине женится обычно на женщине, не в которую влюблен и которой восхищается, а которая обладает качествами, необходимыми для семейной жизни. Ему не нужны головная боль и лишние проблемы. Что бы он ни натворил, возвращаясь домой, он испытывает чувство благодарности перед женой, ждущей его дома, так как она хранит для него порядок в домашнем очаге и не создает проблем, которые лишали бы его покоя. Предпочитая женщин, которые не борются за право быть личностью, в то же время он обращает внимание на их статус в обществе. Женщина обычно занимает определенное место в обществе, в доме мужа она занимает также то место, которое соответствует ее положению в обществе. Женщина не скандалит за право быть “личностью”, она считает, что всему должно быть свое время. Средний турок считает, что все женщины – это некие создания, которых можно покупать. У каждой женщины – своя цена. Женщину, стоимость которой им оплачена, турок очень любит и не сможет от нее отказаться. Он контролирует семейный бюджет, но часть денег, которые жена сможет перетянуть под свое усмотрение, с его ведома передается ей. Таким образом, муж – полный глава семьи. Зарплата жены не имеет на власть мужа никакого влияния. Господствует неписаное правило: “Муж – хозяин как своих денег, так и денег жены”. Типичный турок ревнив. Он никогда не упускает из виду, что женщина может сбежать или изменить ему, а посему он, как правило, бьет жену заранее (авансом), как бы на всякий случай, чтоб не забывалась. Если вы полагаете, что муж, дабы предотвратить уход жены, носит ее на руках, вы глубоко заблуждаетесь, как раз все наоборот, он проводит политику наказания предполагаемых “чертей в тихом омуте”. Он использует все средства, чтобы сузить ее мир. Своими ограничениями он доводит ее до белого каления, почти до сумасшествия, и когда жена бросает его, он никак не возьмет в толк, отчего она развелась с ним, будет считать, что с ним поступили несправедливо. Типичный турок считает ниже мужского достоинства разговаривать или постоянно общаться с женой. В его представлении жена должна быть рентгеновским аппаратом, она должна улавливать его мысли без слов. Женские же устремления он не обязан понимать. Если же он соизволит вас выслушать, то, слушая вас, он будет думать: “Сейчас она, глупышка, полагает, что убедила меня!”. Он очень нуждается в женщине, которая бы служила ему опорой. В женщине он прежде всего видит мать, поэтому хотя в молодости он и руководствуется смутными сексуальными желаниями, то, достигнув среднего возраста, он руководствуется кредо: “Женщина, не изменяющая (верная) своему мужу, – священна!”. Он внутренне привязан именно к таким женщинам и считает, что брак с не девственницами исключен. Мать его ребенка становится главной женщиной в его жизни. Средний турок не любит умных женщин. Для него приемлемы не отягощенные знаниями женщины или такие, которые, обладая ими, не выказывают их ему. Он любит женщин, не являющихся личностью и не способных к самостоятельной жизни, но способных создать для него стабильную семейную жизнь. Круг знакомств жены, с которыми она общается, должен состоять исключительно из женщин. С ними она может общаться лишь в дневное время. Без разрешения мужа жена никуда не может пойти, будь то место близким или удаленным. Прежде всего, она должна заниматься домашними делами. Но если даже все домашние дела сделаны, чтобы пойти куда-то, она все равно должна получить разрешение мужа. Мужчина должен всегда ощущать свою власть. Здесь планетой является мужчина, женщина – лишь спутник, вращающийся вокруг этой планеты. Если же в семье управляет жена, значит, муж, мягко говоря, из тех, кто витает в облаках, вроде не от мира сего. Типичный турецкий мужчина любит поговорить о том, о сем. Он обожает политику, спорит о прочитанном в газетах. Рассказывает о своих сексуальных похождениях в стиле охотничьих рассказов. Подобные рассказы и сам с удовольствием слушает. Разговоры об автомобилях являются главной темой для основательных теоретических дискуссий. Мужчина, не рассуждающий о футболе, – это не мужчина! Ему нравится, когда его хвалят, но ненавидит критику. Вы можете ему говорить не о том, чего он не смог сделать, а о том, что он выполнил с блеском. Его мнение невозможно изменить, так как свои знания, убеждения и решения он считает абсолютно верными. Но, с другой стороны, каждый человек и каждая вещь могут быть изменены и подстроены под его представления. Раз есть такая удобная “философия”, вы никогда не сможете ему втолковать, для чего, собственно, нужны изменения. Легче самой измениться. По сути, многие женщины так и поступают; делают вид, что повинуются, а на самом деле управляют мужчиной. Типичный турецкий мужчина не уверен в себе, а посему он ревнив, излишне опекает женщину, многое ей запрещает и вообще ведет себя эгоцентрично. Он – сторонник статус-кво. То, что делают партии с авторитарными лидерами и наше государство, он все это повторяет в своей жизни. Его совершенно не радуют демократия, участие в чем-либо, равенство и права человека, так как он любит порядок и ненавидит тех, кто его нарушает. Стиль жизни, которой он не жил, не может быть для него неким руководством. Такие плоды цивилизации, как утонченность и изящество, существенно на него не влияют. Он предпочитает использовать грубую силу. Он счастлив и верит в величие своего существования как такового. Тот прототип среднестатистического турка, который здесь представлен, является создателем главных опор, подпирающих всю структуру нашего общества. На вопрос “Откуда возникают проблемы в социальной сфере?” можно ответить с многих точек зрения. Что касается меня, то я хотела бы указать о необходимости поиска ответа на этот вопрос с точки зрения взаимоотношений мужчины и женщины. Если наше стремление к собственному величию будет строиться на подавлении других, то такой строй будет называться тоталитарным. Когда мужчины жалуются на тоталитарные порядки, может быть, им полезно было бы обратить внимание на то, какими методами они сами пользуются в решении своих проблем. Строй, который, невзирая на классовые различия, смог создать подобный прототип среднего мужчины, определяет и весь стиль жизни. Представления и убеждения, проистекающие из принципа “Всегда будь мужчиной”, объединяющего собой, например, мужчину-мясника и мужчину-преподавателя, предупреждают нас об опасности превращения страны многообразных взглядов в страну однотипных людей. (Перевел с турецкого Р.Ф. Мухаметдинов.) Türkçeden Rusçaya çevirdi R.F.Muhametdinov

sunypress.edu Questo libro ha diritto alla spedizione gratuita. Leggi i dettagli. Titolo: Contemporary Islamic Conversations: M. Fethullah Gulen on Turkey, Islam, and the West Autore: Nevval Sevindi Redattore: Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’ Editore: State University of New York Press Data di Pubblicazione: January 2008 ISBN: 0791473538 ISBN-13: 9780791473535 Reparto: Islam – General amazon.co.uk

Women will be the locomotives of a greater and more powerful Turkey. The women who are oppressed, but who represent a secret power, will take over the future of the country. The female power will take stage when the Democrat Party (DP) is in power and will become the shining star of the country. Women will have an impact in every field of life. Atatürk created a new country and implemented his revolutions with the help of women. Courageous women who protect their flag, their country and their homeland will find the solidarity they have been longing for in the DP. This is because the DP is opening a new road for women’s movements. Women are necessary for democracy because their voices in the decision making mechanism certify it as democratic. True democracy will thrive with women, cannot exist without women, and we will ensure at least 30 percent female representation. Respect for women is democracy. The key to change, renewal and democracy is women. We need the other half of the country in order to become a distinguish nation in the world. From daughters of Dede Korkut to daughters of Mustafa Kemal For 1,000 years women have always had a unique place in Turkish culture. The daughters of Dede Korkut would ride horses, were archers and selected their husbands by wrestling with them. They would exist together with men in every part of life and they fought side-by-side with them. Daughters of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk will take the stage and carry the legacy of the Nene Hatuns further. Family is the basis of society and development. To support women is to improve the quality of family and strengthen society. The DP will provide social security schemes to all women, including housewives. Democracy will be established in homes, in neighborhoods and around the country. The rights of children and women will be secured and international contracts will be implemented. Discrimination and violence against women in the home will be prevented and deaths of mothers and children will be stopped. Economic, social and cultural measures against the poverty of women will be implemented. Gender discrimination will be eliminated in every area of life and female entrepreneurship will be fostered. Furthermore girls will be provided equal opportunities in education. As women serve as the bases of solidarity in a neighborhood, they will serve on neighborhood councils and women’s consultation centers will be founded. We will open women’s shelters in every province and ensure their participation in municipal services. We will develop policies in consultation with women and will provide health services at the household and neighborhood levels. We will ensure access of every child to physicians. We will establish women’s production centers in every neighborhood as well as nurseries. “Poppy women’s groups” will fight against violence and drug abuse and female compassion will put an end to children sleeping in the streets. The DP will help fly Turkey on two wings and all women will be covered by the general health insurance program. With new legislation there will be no uninsured woman. We regard what housewives do as a profession. We will enact a law that introduces retirement and social security schemes to housewives in addition to supporting female employment in business and bureaucracy. We will provide loans to housewives to bring economic independence to women and will introduce European standards for maternity and nursing leave. The freedom of women is a prerequisite for being European. The DP government will regard discrimination as an offense and will design legislation to prevent against it. The DP government will give priority to the disabled in basic services and will provide life-long care for the disabled with financial needs. * Nevval Sevindi is a journalist, writer and DP parliamentary candidate from İstanbul. ——————————————————————————– Tuzlada oturuyoruz. Sizi desteklemek isterdik ama oyumuzu Ankarada kullanmamız lazım. Ama ben yinede kesinlikle Demokrat Partiye vereceğim. Sizleri mecliste görmek bizlere gurur verecek. www.sadakat.net Sadakat ailesi olarak demokratlıyız. — Gönderen: SUAT YILDIZ
E-Posta:onu: TEBRİK
Mesaj: DEGRLİ NEVVAL HANIM ZAMAN GAZETESİNDE YAZDIGINIZ YAZILARINIZI HEMEN HEMEN HERGUN OKUYORUM TANIDIKLARIMA TAVSIYE EDIYORUM GERCEKTEN GUNDEMI DETAYLI OLARAK İŞLIYOSUNUZ SIZI TEBRIK EDER BAŞARILARINIZN DEVAMINI DLERIM SUAT YILDIZ AGRI…
Gönderim Zamanı: 16-07-2007

Nevval Sevindi is running for Parliament on the list of the center-right Democratic Party. Her election flyer describes her as a “brave intellectual who calls herself Muslim, Turkish and modern.” If you were running for Parliament from Istanbul’s First Region, which is a large area covering most of the Asian side, how would you reach the voters? Many candidates use classic tactics: Distributing pamphlets, grab-and-grin tours and playing loud music from extravagant buses. Nevval Sevindi has invented a smarter tactic. She is trying to win over taxi drivers, who can, possibly, win over their customers to her campaign. Sevindi, a public figure in Turkey, is a champion of women’s rights. She has been a columnist for daily Zaman for more than a decade. There are at least a dozen books, many TV appearances and countless public speeches in her resume. She is especially distinguished as a secular woman who defends the rights of Turkey’s conservative Muslims, including the ones wearing a headscarf. Her friendship with Fethullah Gülen, the country’s most popular and influential civil religious leader, is something that some ultra-secular Turks see as treason to her own social class. She thinks it is rather about being democratic and open-minded. Nowadays Sevindi is quite busy, because she is running for Parliament on the electoral list of the center-right Democratic Party, which is led by Mehmet Ağar. It seems that Ağar trusts her a lot, and that is why he put this newcomer – she joined the party only a few month ago – on the top of his list for Istanbul’s First Region. Here, the candidate of the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) is no one other than Tayyip Erdoğan. “My opponent is the prime minister,” says Sevindi. “I think it is a fair match.” In Turkey each party creates a list of its candidates for electoral regions. The higher you are on the list, the more chance you stand of getting elected. Since Sevindi is the first name on the list – and by the way she is the only woman to be that prominent in any party’s list for Istanbul – her seat in Parliament looks to be virtually guaranteed. Yet there is a problem: Her party needs to pass the nation-wide 10 percent electoral threshold, and the polls show that the chances of that are 50-50. Thus Sevindi keeps her fingers crossed, and her campaign boosted. Her election flyer describes her as a “brave intellectual who calls herself Muslim, Turkish and modern.” Besides that broad picture, she is interested in the mundane issues of local politics. I spent three hours with her last Monday, during which she visited four taxi hubs in the Kadıköy area, at which she spoke convincingly about the problems of the cab drivers, about which you probably would have no idea. “Rüsum is unjust and it needs to be abolished,” she said; a comment that made the drivers happy and left me clueless. ‘Rüsum’ is a sort of levy that the Istanbul municipality collects from each cab driver twice a year. Actually for the drivers, it was interesting enough that a parliamentary candidate – and, moreover, a charming one – has come to visit their modest place. “You are the first candidate that has come to talk to us,” said a middle-aged driver at the taxi stand called “18 Mart Taksi Durağı.” In another one, Osman Oruç, who runs the taxi stand “Oruçlar Taksi Durağı,” appreciated their political guest because “she takes notes while talking with people; that means she is serious.” She was indeed. And her campaign looks promising. The real question is, of course, whether her party will get 10 percent of the votes and make its way to Parliament. That will determine her political fate, and perhaps even the economic fate of the rüsum-stricken cab drivers. Dear Nevval, though I’m sorry that the DP failed and you couldn’t make it to the parliament, I hope you can take it and I’m rather sure that you’ll remain in the public/political scene. I guess some progress has been made despite all; at least, I take the candidacy of a prominent Alevi on the AKP ticket as a sign of this, as well as the (moderate) increase of women in parliament, the rejection of a military coup of sort by the voters, the return of the DTP-Kurds to the parliament. And the general fact that the legitimacy of the parliament has been strengthened considerably – besides the above-mentioned, by high voter participation and by a better representation of votes in parliament. It’s a sad irony that the ten-percent-monster has hit exactly the DP. With a German five-percent-hurdle, the DP might be in the position of the “kingmaker”, like was often the case with the German liberals (FDP). As to the DP, are we going to see a Yilmaz – Ciller rivalry again? But whatsoever, another positive aspect of current events may be the speech of a new constitution by Erdogan and many others. That will be a big task and challenge not just for parliament or some experts, but for society at large. Hopefully. Best wishes, Hans-Peter

Wir blicken durch die offene Kuppel zum Himmel. Und sehen dann unten gleich das Wasserbecken. Eine mongolische Tradition. Das Becken war mit Wasser gefüllt, und die Menschen befassten sich im Widerschein der Sterne, die nachts durch die Kuppel schienen, mit Astronomie; ihre Berechnungen der Sterne werden heute noch für fehlerlos gehalten. Die Ornamente der türkisfarbenen Fayencen und der Kufi-Inschriften in den Nischen und über den Türen wirken wie Anfang und Ende runder Formen, verbunden mit Sternbildern. Kubadabad, bekannt als selçukisches Serail, aus Lehm erbaut, am Beyşehir-See, ist ein Sommerpalast. Auf der einzigen, von der Sultansresidenz aus dem 13. Jahrhundert übriggebliebenen Mauer hat man – zum Schutz – eine potthässliche Brunnenanlage aus Beton errichtet. Das sieht schrecklich aus, und dadurch ist die Palastruine verschandelt worden. Verschmitzt lächelt das Serail über diesen primitiven Bau. Auf vielen Fayencen im Museum erkenne ich, wie deutlich die Selçuken den Motiven des Kreuzes und des menschlichen Gesichts Ausdruck verliehen haben. Alles Byzantinische wurde imitiert; daher wurden unglaublich viele Säulen in den Moscheen aufgestellt. Die Selçuken bilden die islamische Auffassung vom menschlichen Gesicht ab, zeichnen mythologische Wesen mit menschlichen Zügen oder als Relief. Als schönstes Beispiel der selçukischen Kunst heißt uns das Tor der İnce Minare Medrese, der Hochschule aus dem 13. Jahrhundert, mit seinem Artischockenornament willkommen. Dieses Portal weist mit seinen verschlungenen Formen in die Höhe und hat Zeltcharakter. Das Minarett mit seinen beiden Umgängen ist mit türkisfarbenen Keramikfliesen verziert. 1901 schlug dort der Blitz ein, und dadurch ist das Minarett, das sehr hoch war, zur Hälfte eingestürzt. Von dort aus betrachtet es Konya. Ziegelmauern, ornamentierte Decken, Leoparden, Hirsche und Pfauen sind die Merkmale der selçukischen Kunst. Zwei Engelreliefs, die vom Tor der selçukischen Festung hierher gebracht wurden, wirken schön, wirken ästhetisch. Das von den Hethitern übernommene Löwensymbol setzt sich bei den Selçuken fort. Auch der doppelköpfige Adler folgte der hethitischen Göttin Hepatu und wurde selçukisch. Überall begegnet uns der Kult um Göttinnen, angefangen von der Muttergöttin Kybele. Mit einem Lächeln zeigen die Motive der Weltkugeln an den Portalen unserer Zeit die Astronomiekenntnisse der Selçuken. Im Museum des Mevlana, in seinem Grabmal drängen sich die Touristen. Wir betreten es durch das Tor, an dem ausländische Männer in Shorts Röcke überziehen und hineingehen. Frauen beten vor den Sarkophagen des Mevlana und seines Vaters, küssen den gläsernen Schaukasten und beten. In seiner Großherzigkeit heißt der Mevlana die Gäste willkommen. Die Alaeddin-Keykubat-Moschee wurde im Jahr 1155 errichtet, eine der ältesten Moscheen des 12. Jahrhunderts. Sie hat 42 Säulen mit korinthischen und ionischen Kapitellen. Wie viele römische und griechische Säulen es auch sein mögen, sie wurden alle beim Bau der Moschee aufgestellt. Und das Innere der Moschee – auf einem Niveau, das einen Preis für schlechte Restauration verdient hätte – ist von einem Ende bis zum anderen mit einem einfachen Teppichboden bedeckt, und das zeigt, was die Muslime unter dem 800-jährigen Erbe verstehen. Dank einer Form der Restauration, die allen ästhetischen Gesetzen und der Geschichte spottet, ist die Moschee in einem bedauernswerten Zustand. Die grünen Eisenregale, auf denen man drinnen die Schuhe abstellt, und die schlechten Ledervorhänge an den Türen lassen einem jede Freude an der Andacht vergehen. Währenddessen erfahre ich, dass eine der ältesten Moscheen (in Kappadokien) die Form eines Glockenturms hat, und dass es Glocken sind, die nie geläutet werden. In späterer Zeit hat man begonnen, ein Minarett neben der „Glocken-Moschee“ zu bauen, und schließlich ist das Minarett das einzige, das – hier – von den Osmanen geblieben ist. Und jetzt hat man schreckliche Minarette in Form von Raketen entdeckt. Da man überall Moscheen gebaut hat, gibt es Moscheen im Abstand von zehn Metern. Daher ist es in dieser Touristenstadt unmöglich, alkoholische Getränke zu bekommen. Denn Lokalen in einer Entfernung von dreihundert Metern zu Gebäuden wie Moscheen und Medresen wird laut Gesetz keine Lizenz zum Ausschank von Alkohol erteilt. Diese Frage wird durch den Bau neuer Moscheen gelöst. Um Alkohol zu bekommen, muss man bis Meram fahren, einen etwa acht Kilometer entfernten kleinen Ort. Dennoch erreichen Sie nicht, was Sie wollen, denn in dem anheimelnden Teegarten herrscht Alkoholverbot. Der Chauffeur meint, dass die Leute nichts vom Trinken verstehen und ihre Umgebung stören, und daher sei Alkohol verboten, damit man mit der Familie zusammensitzen könne. Es ist doch ganz natürlich, dass sie nichts vom Alkoholtrinken verstehen, denn es sind Leute, die einer Kultur fern stehen, die sie gar nicht kennen. Ich wollte wissen, was für Unterhaltungsmöglichkeiten es in Konya gibt. Gibt es Vergnügungsstätten, Orte, an denen junge Leute ihre Freizeit verbringen können? Drei Stellen konnte ich ausmachen, das Lokal, das eine Dame im Souterrain des Hotels Eşref betreibt – „Bei Sabriye“ –, die Diskothek sowie die Bar des Hotels Huma und die Nezih-Bar. Die Hoşseda Bar, ein Bierlokal am Busbahnhof, soll ein Lokal mit Alkoholausschank sein, das nur Männern zugänglich ist. Ich ging in die Oper, den einzigen Ort, an dem man von Qualität sprechen kann, um Live-Musik zu hören. Ein Mann und ein junges Mädchen, eine Gesangsstudentin, singen. Die jungen Leute wirken ziemlich ruhig. Junge Frauen und Männer sitzen zusammen. Ich frage junge Leute, die Kommunikationswissenschaft studieren: „Wie verbringen junge Leute ihre Freizeit in Konya? Was für Unterhaltungsmöglichkeiten gibt es?“ Die Antwort des jungen Manns ist kritisch: „Junge Leute haben keinerlei Freizeitvergnügen in Konya. Wer hier studiert, flieht aus Konya, sobald sich die Gelegenheit ergibt, und geht aufs Land, um sich zu vergnügen. Hier gibt es nur ein Kino und außerdem das Staatstheater. Zuletzt wurde ein Stück von Haldun Taner aufgeführt.“ Eine dunkelhaarige Studentin, die Theaterwissenschaft studiert, meint: „Es gibt aber auch Studenten, die so etwas mögen.“ Es wurde nicht zugelassen, dass ein neues Lokal mit Alkoholausschank eröffnet wurde. Vor zwei Jahren wurden in der Azel-Bar, die dem Rathaus gegenüberliegt, mehrmals Bomben gelegt und danach wurde die Bar geschlossen. Unser Kampf um den Alkohol, über den in holländischen Zeitschriften berichtet wurde! Was die Jugendlichen und ein paar Leute aus Konya erzählen, zeigt, dass das Vergnügen systematisch zunichte gemacht wird. Um sich zu vergnügen, ziehen Leute, die es sich leisten können, weg von Konya, in andere Städte. Ich gehe ins Hotel Şahin, und auch dort machen drei junge Leute Live-Musik. Drinnen ist alles von Zigarettenrauch vernebelt. Hier wird getanzt. Obwohl in dem riesigen Saal voller junger Leute eine heitere, angenehme Stimmung herrscht, hat man doch ein Gefühl von Bedrückung. Doch die Städte in Anatolien haben kein Stadtleben. Es gibt keine Stadtluft. Man kann nur essen, trinken und nach Hause gehen. Viele Städte in Anatolien kennen weder Kino und Theater noch Konzerte. Das soziale und kulturelle Leben wird vom politischen Fanatismus erstickt.

They insist on your tasting each dish. No one gets up before you do, not even the children. Tea, coffee and fruit are served constantly. Everyone tries to make you comfortable. They give you the TV remote control. Cushions are placed under you and behind your back. Even if they are dead tired, no one goes to bed before they bid you good-bye. When you attempt to leave, they don’t let you. They give you their bed and they sleep on the couch or armchair. Then you leave the house and the same people change 180 degrees. Everyone drives their car aggressively. If you don’t stick the front end of your car out, no one gives you the way. Horns, cursing… as if the world is coming to an end. It’s not even possible to change lanes. If you are a pedestrian it’s not possible to cross the street without a stoplight. How is it that people act one way at home, but differently in the car? I haven’t figured it out.” He thinks Turks have been able to explain their own schizophrenic fragmentation. Turks do not know either why they always denigrate politics and show the least amount of trust in politics in surveys, but when they enter politics, they become a political monster just like a traffic monster. They never think that they act like those people they do not like and approve of. From the automobile driver to the intellectual, they do not know why their actions do not match their words and why they blow in the wind like a scarecrow. They do not try and understand that their eyes, which see others’ mistakes very clearly, suddenly close tight when it comes to their own mistakes. They do not want their consciences to feel pain. For the weight of being guilty immediately makes their eyelids heavy as if pieces of iron were hanging from them. They fly with the weightlessness of always blaming someone else. For that reason, they do not care about red lights. They carry the mask of always being right in their pockets or on the top of their heads. They are constantly suffocating from not being able to resolve problems, but they do not want to know why they escape from responsibility. Men are afraid to love; couples believe it is necessary to have “one-sided love.” Their lips say that respect is more important than love, and their hearts are blocks of ice frozen from fear. They neither draw close to the responsibility of marriage nor accept the deep pleasure and happiness of loving on their own. They only hide behind the confusion of the light sauce of their words. They never remember the weight of words. They neither stand behind their words nor donate them to life. They are far from lips whose ideal has burned like an ember because their words have no strength. None of the solutions they seek in bars are able to open the sailor’s knots one centimeter. Strangely enough, they are not interested in what could solve their problems. They do not know a more important place on this earth than the seat, label, title and position they hang onto. There their memories are erased as if the delete button has been pushed. They do not want to understand why they love and why they hate what they do not know. Their hands, which are tied tightly to the law of not changing and accepting everything as it is, are around their own throats. They do not trust their children’s decisions; they spoil them and do everything they want. After 20 years of age they protest everything. They forget their former passions and feelings. They oppose every kind of emotion. While living like they are surrounded by meaningless fears, they do not look anyone in the eye with their non-trusting glances. They do not show the courage to look anyone in the face. They have no courage. When we look at these observations, we can see what Turkey needs in order to change as it approaches the election lane: individuals who leave prints of love instead of meaningless hatred and fear; those who respect other kinds of love as they admit their love for their country; those who turn democracy into a democratic state of the heart; those who regard the state of the heart and embrace everyone with love while they live religion; citizens who do not regard politics as an area of life that cannot be attained; understanding and accepting people… 12.26.2006 Dear Nevval, I would like to soften your anger a bit. I know this kind of disappointment quite well, but for me it was primarily with the Germans. Nonetheless, it’s quite the same everywhere. People are rather inconsistent, even the greatest saints. Yet, those who may be considered saints spend much of their life to become less inconsistent – and still they fail to some degree. People are much the same around the world; I guess even in Japan. Finally I found records of a really compelling guitar band from Turkey, just by chance, called Gece Yolculari. I guess it means something like Night Wanderers, which meets a point here. Even more fortunately, a small trading enterprise (yokyok24 in Frankfurt a.M.) where names like Athena and Sagopa Kajmer are available, among others. This is a field that should be expanded, if possible. And I wish you a happy New Year. Hans-Peter

In 1792 Madam de La Roque settled in Aachen with her mother. While escaping from the oppression of the French army, they eventually arrived in Bremen. She explains in her memoirs how the tolerance of Germans decreased in the North. A sign above the city gate in Aachen said “Jews and immigrants can’t stay.” The state of Westphalia was described as being more savage than civilized. A thinker and photographer I talked with in China said that before the revolution it was written “Dogs and Chinese cannot enter” on coffee-shop doors. I saw in his face what it meant to live like this in a city like Shanghai. In other words, just as Western racist ideology was practiced in Europe; it was perpetuated in every country under their exploitation, as well. I would suggest that everyone who says that Turkey is nationalistic should live in Europe. In Turkey during the Cold War, anyone could be gotten rid of by labeling them as a communist. It struck the freedom of universities the most. Now the Cold War is over. The Western world has chosen Islam as its enemy, but Turkey chose ‘political reaction.’ In every political period making the “other” a scapegoat only brings about destruction. It’s putting an embargo on the country’s future, tying up intelligence and letting the dogs loose. A blood stain is permanent. For that reason, it is essential to struggle against terror that murders the innocent. Outside of that, making a blood feud and going after the “other” does not unite a nation; it divides it. Turkey needs a homogeneous society more than ever. A body lives together with differences, but in agreement on homogeneous cultural values. Without a common base, you can’t put common goals. A Turkey without common goals will turn like an empty spinning wheel. Another German intellectual made this observation about Turkey: “When I first went to Konya, I never thought it would affect me this deeply. I’ve gone 30 times to date. Konya is called Turkey’s most conservative place. I don’t think so. Some of the Turks in Germany are very much behind Konya in culture. Without looking at the difference between villager and city dweller, they put everyone in the same basket due to Islam.” Europe is trying to take out on the “other” the pain of not being able to define its own identity. As long as Turkey doesn’t define its own identity, it will try and be superior to the “other,” but for nothing! Europe is a political, cultural region that has lived and is living in the most extreme state of nationalism. Because our culture is not racist, we can’t be that nationalistic. We need a new definition of nationalism. The creation of this definition requires a serious theoretical study, not coffee talk. This century is a period when developed countries are quickly becoming renewed and changing concepts. If Turkey becomes isolationist, it will remain beyond the world. This means it will become a dinosaur that continues to live in the Cold War period. If they hadn’t opposed this, where would Havel and his intellectual friends be today in the Czech Republic? We can’t advance by being enemies of Europe and America. We can’t escape mental atrophy. What’s important is not what they did, but what we didn’t do. The things we haven’t done and those who prevented us are our own cultural Great Wall of China. Those who don’t love their own culture and religion don’t love themselves. Does someone who doesn’t love himself have a future? He can be in power, but nothing else. There are those who appear to love, but they aren’t sincere. They are at least as dangerous as the other dinosaurs. Sincerity is possible with knowledge. Our forefathers said, “Instead of an ignorant friend, let me have an intelligent enemy.” Turkey should reject the freedom to be ignorant and pass over this threshold. We have to be able to open the road to knowledge, wisdom and sagacity. October 10, 2006 10.11.2006 Dear Nevval, you finished this comment (quoted below) with a saying that is customary in Germany since “time immemorial” (“better (to have) an intelligent foe than a silly friend”, or “he who has such friends doesn’t need enemies” – there are several variations of that motto). I didn’t know that it’s traditional in Turkey, too. A bit earlier you provoke the following question of mine: How do you know that something is your “own” culture or religion? And how to compel your neighbor to love it as well, or as much, as yourself? Nonetheless, I’m clear that you’re right insofar as Turkey needs to become a nation. There is an old definition of the nation that has nothing to do with what you may be used to understand with the term nationalism. The nation is the sovereign of a state and implies all its citizens. You certainly know that the Swiss nation, the oldest of the world since it dates back to the 13th to 14th century, has four official languages. Which means that all the connotations the term “nationalism” frequently is burdened with, are not essential. There is no need for a common language, religion, race or such. These are just weird and deplorable misunderstandings. The essential thing for a nation is to relate to the same common administration AND TO BE ITS SOVEREIGN. It means that the people are the master of the state, not the other way around. It means that the people among themselves are equal, that they are free as long as they don’t harm the freedom of the others; but they equally submit to a common law that they themselves establish through their parliament. This is the idea of a political “nation”. The people, through parties and other organizations, negotiate their nationhood. Which means, that laws and regulations are not imposed by a religious body, nor by a ruling bureaucracy. In Turkey, it’s still the late-Ottoman bureaucracy against the lower-ulema Islamism (which is basically a populist conservatism). Neither can create a nation, nor can they together create it. The nation may emerge when people take things in their own hands. This may be a gradual process, starting with economic and cultural activities. That’s why the recent “rose” and “orange” revolutions were highly symbolic: the people publicly declared that “We are the nation!” This is what a nation is all about. Of course, the political process is much more complicated. But the lack of a nation in this sense is also the most serious obstacle on Turkey’s way into the EU. As a feminist German journalist, who has quite some Turkish friends, quite rightly wrote, approximately: “The EU is the way to GATHER the democratic nations of Europe – it is not designed to MAKE them.” Meaning of course Turkey in first line. I differ from and in some sense disagree with her in that I think that the accession process should actively SUPPORT the emergence of a Turkish nation. But in fact, only the Turks themselves can actually make it. Good luck! Hans-Peter ps A critical aspect of Europe you may find discussed in the annex. It appeared recently on a French website. Next I intend to discuss geography in its relevant aspects. hp NEVVAL SEVINDI 10.13.2006 Friday – Time for a New Definition for Nationalism zaman In Europe Islam is a concept that is being fabricated in people’s minds. This danger grows with people’s fears, politicians playing on these fears and provocations of the media. European intellectuals are people who comprehend Islam and its culture. A professor of religion said at a fast-breaking dinner that in Europe those from other religions were burned. In 1555 a decision was made that everyone could choose the religion in their own region. Burning left migration in its place. In 1792 Madam de La Roque settled in Aachen with her mother. While escaping from the oppression of the French army, they eventually arrived in Bremen. She explains in her memoirs how the tolerance of Germans decreased in the North. A sign above the city gate in Aachen said “Jews and immigrants can’t stay.” The state of Westphalia was described as being more savage than civilized. A thinker and photographer I talked with in China said that before the revolution it was written “Dogs and Chinese cannot enter” on coffee-shop doors. I saw in his face what it meant to live like this in a city like Shanghai. In other words, just as Western racist ideology was practiced in Europe; it was perpetuated in every country under their exploitation, as well. I would suggest that everyone who says that Turkey is nationalistic should live in Europe. In Turkey during the Cold War, anyone could be gotten rid of by labeling them as a communist. It struck the freedom of universities the most. Now the Cold War is over. The Western world has chosen Islam as its enemy, but Turkey chose ‘political reaction.’ In every political period making the “other” a scapegoat only brings about destruction. It’s putting an embargo on the country’s future, tying up intelligence and letting the dogs loose. A blood stain is permanent. For that reason, it is essential to struggle against terror that murders the innocent. Outside of that, making a blood feud and going after the “other” does not unite a nation; it divides it. Turkey needs a homogeneous society more than ever. A body lives together with differences, but in agreement on homogeneous cultural values. Without a common base, you can’t put common goals. A Turkey without common goals will turn like an empty spinning wheel. Another German intellectual made this observation about Turkey: “When I first went to Konya, I never thought it would affect me this deeply. I’ve gone 30 times to date. Konya is called Turkey’s most conservative place. I don’t think so. Some of the Turks in Germany are very much behind Konya in culture. Without looking at the difference between villager and city dweller, they put everyone in the same basket due to Islam.” Europe is trying to take out on the “other” the pain of not being able to define its own identity. As long as Turkey doesn’t define its own identity, it will try and be superior to the “other,” but for nothing! Europe is a political, cultural region that has lived and is living in the most extreme state of nationalism. Because our culture is not racist, we can’t be that nationalistic. We need a new definition of nationalism. The creation of this definition requires a serious theoretical study, not coffee talk. This century is a period when developed countries are quickly becoming renewed and changing concepts. If Turkey becomes isolationist, it will remain beyond the world. This means it will become a dinosaur that continues to live in the Cold War period. If they hadn’t opposed this, where would Havel and his intellectual friends be today in the Czech Republic? We can’t advance by being enemies of Europe and America. We can’t escape mental atrophy. What’s important is not what they did, but what we didn’t do. The things we haven’t done and those who prevented us are our own cultural Great Wall of China. Those who don’t love their own culture and religion don’t love themselves. Does someone who doesn’t love himself have a future? He can be in power, but nothing else. There are those who appear to love, but they aren’t sincere. They are at least as dangerous as the other dinosaurs. Sincerity is possible with knowledge. Our forefathers said, “Instead of an ignorant friend, let me have an intelligent enemy.” Turkey should reject the freedom to be ignorant and pass over this threshold. We have to be able to open the road to knowledge, wisdom and sagacity. October 10, 2006 e-mail:n.sevindi@zaman.com.tr About the Identity of Europe and Why it is a Problem. Hans-Peter Geissen Certainly, we may assume that everybody who speaks about Europe knows that “Erep” is an ancient Syrian (Semitic) term meaning sunset, or west; and that its opposite is “Assu”, the sunrise, or east. It is therefore clear that Europe is not Asia, just as East is not West. Moreover, there is no difficulty to understand that the term means a direction on the surface of the earth and therefore is geographical. The difficulty lies in the fact that it is a relative term, depending on the viewpoint of the observer. From a North American viewpoint, for instance, Erep is what we commonly call Japan and China, and Assu may start in Iceland or France. But for orientation as to what may be meant in global terms we may take the ancient city of Assur, which is in today’s northern Iraq. The “Christian Club” It may then seem astonishing that quite a many of people claim that Europe’s identity would be harmed by a religion, Islam. Or that “the European Union must decide wether it is a Christian Club”, as Mr. Erdogan had put it some times ago. Religion is not a geographical term. Then, how can it determine or harm something geographical ? That seems quite nonsensical. Nevertheless, we may look at this from an empirical viewpoint and establish that here the term has been shifted from a geographical to a spiritual meaning. We cannot henceforth discuss the issue in geographic terms, and it would mean a serious confusion of mind were we to determine geographical borders of spirit. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe had it: “The Spirit blows wherever it wants.” Or not, as we might add. However, we might move to a common denominator of geography and human spirit, which we may find in history. It may reveal which spirit was blowing where, and even when. And still more. Of course, then, we must restrict ourselves to times when Christianity at least was in existence. In this sense, Cesar or Cicero, Socrates or Aristoteles, Vercingetorix or Armin(ius) were not European. And in fact, the term “European” was not in use in these times. It came into use in the Middle Ages, when indeed spiritual and geographical terms mingled. It is difficult for us today, to understand what exactly the term “Holy Roman Empire” meant. Perhaps, it would be wrong to search for accuracy in this context. But it is clear that “holy” is a spiritual term and “Rome” a geographical one. And “empire” relates to space, too, at least in effect. However, “European” did not just relate to that empire, which roughly contained what today is Germany and (north to central) Italy, and some neighboring regions. “Europe” in this sense contained France, Britain and (northern) Spain as well. “European” was a political term meaning those lands which provided warriors for crusades against the Muslims, then established in what was not “Europe”. The very term “crusade”, of course, related to the Christian cross, so we may guess that the spiritual meaning is quite obvious. “Europe”, then, is a bigger “Holy Empire”, or, in German, a “Reich”. Moreover, it is anti-Islamic by definition. But if we look at crusades in a broader context, they were, at times, also directed against the “pagans” in eastern regions of what then became “Europe”, and against the “heretic” Orthodox church. “Crusades” were also directed against deviant Western Christian groups like the Catharians, Albigensians, or Waldensians. We can, thus, not describe this Europe as simply Christian. It is more precisely Roman-Christian. The Problem We may then ask why this should be a problem today. Didn’t we have developments like Humanism and Enlightenment, which surpassed the boundaries of (Western) Christianity? Hadn’t already the Anglicans, the Lutherans and Calvinists, and finally the French Revolution succeeded in breaking free of Roman domination? Hadn’t the popes even been removed from Rome to Avignon and then, already in 1338, even been denied a role in the elevation of the “Holy Roman” emperor? Don’t we include Orthodox Christianity in Europe, relate our thinking to Aristotle and Cicero, or even mention a “Jewo”-Christian heritage? Aren’t we secularists today, isn’t even the Roman Church in favor of secularism? Yes. And yet, we inherited antiislamism. It is this inherited antiislamism that is motivating the fundamental-opposition against Turkey’s EU-accession, and it is in many of the more subtle forms of opposition or even of apparent approval. It may be fatal to underestimate the consequences. Spiritually, what is inherited here implicates the eradication of the evil. The physical appearance of the evil may be Albigensians, Iberian or Balkan Muslims, or witches, or wolves, or the “Jewish World Conspiracy”. Indeed, the “Third Reich” may be explicable best in terms of this heritage. We may ask wether Stalinism isn’t just another of its distant consequences, irrespective wether some historians call it “Asiatic”. Stalinism is about eradication of the (perceived) evil and is quite alien to any Asian culture, as far as my limited knowledge can reach. There are more subtle forms of this heritage. Despite we know well about the importance of Islamic societies in the Iberian peninsula and Sicily for the development of both European Humanism and Enlightenment, and we don’t bother to use Arabic numerals and Arabic terms like algebra and chemistry – “European History” ist mostly described as if it were without an Islamic heritage. But in fact, its development is not at all understandable without. Not without Islamic cultures and not without antiislamism. That is, we are dealing with an interaction, with synergistic and antagonistic aspects. This in turn is of course just one of many interactions that formed Europe, both on a European and global scale. But not something unimportant enough to omit. In fact, Islamic rule in Iberia tolerated large Christian and Jewish populations, and here it was that ancient Greek and other (Roman, Persian, Arabic) authors were translated from Arabic to West-European languages. Ironically, while “the evil” was eradicated in the Iberian peninsula, it expanded in the Balkan peninsula. And, still, in the Anatolian peninsula, where however it had started earlier. The Ottomans Ottoman expansion in the Balkans caused a flood of antiturkish and antiislamic propaganda that is an essential part of our “European Heritage”. The Ottoman proceedings in this conquest gave considerable reasons for deepest fears. First, they were militarily superior due to combined use of the disciplined (and quite Roman) Jannissary phalanx and Turkmenic light cavallery, superior logistics on campaign and in finance, and by the early use of cannons and musquets. Moreover, they allied with and co-opted Christian princes of the Balkan people, and finally the whole “Byzantine” (Orthodox) church. For the commoners, things depended on their geographic position. In the respective borderlands, they were subjected to the never-ending “Akinci” raids, which were among the reasonable grounds to name “the Turk” “terrible”. “He” indeed was. Which doesn’t mean that “Christian” raids into Ottoman lands were much different. Whatsoever, once inside the Ottoman Empire, the “Pax Ottomanica” had considerable advantages. Exploitation of the peasantry remained comparatively low and didn’t imply serfdom. Nor were they forced to change their religious creed. Even many of those who had been enslaved in Akinci raids could hope to be manumitted some years later and find acceptable conditions of life. However, in their case conversion to Islam was strongly advisable. Peasants and other commoners living further apart from Ottoman frontiers could compare the rumours coming in from the “Turkish empire”, relating to the absence of serfdom and of religious persecution for instance, with their current conditions. This in turn was probably reason enough to rain down as much defaming propaganda against “the Turk” on the boorish people as possible. Most efficiently from the church pulpits and at times in daily rhythm. Not much fantasy is needed to imagine why the effects may still be seen easily in Austria and Southern Germany, whereas they are much weaker in Northern Germany, or in Scandinavia. There were several political effects of Ottoman policies on European Christianity. First, they inherited from the Seljuks and other Islamic principalities the sympathy with the monophysite churches, especially the Armenian and Syrian, and their protection against the impositions of the Greek (Orthodox) church. Even more importantly, they first weakened but then protected the Orthodox themselves. Rather decisive for European history were their wars against Catholic Habsburg, without which the survival and establishing of Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism would in all probability not have been possible. And then we have the example of Transsylvania, which under Ottoman suzerainity saw the Orthodox, Lutherans, Catholics and Calvinists (and a few Armenians) live together quite peacefully. Which means that the first peaceful coexistence of the major European Christian denominations was possible under Ottoman rule, and only under Ottoman rule it was even thinkable. One should probably not underestimate the pedagogical effects on the whole of Europe. The autonomous principality of Transsylvania was at that time a major trade post between Central and Southeastern Europe, extending to Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands, Anatolia and the Balkans, the northern Black Sea region, even to Italy and Sweden. Unforeseen, or nearly so, here we are back in geography. Once again, admittedly. History is used here as a common denominator of the two. Spiritually, there were virtually no Muslims in this “second convivenzia”, and Jews were largely excluded from the public sphere. And nonetheless, it was again Muslim request that enabled coexistence of Christians. Next we will see that secular Christians still imagine that they developed secularism without the help of Muslims, and even against “Asiatic Despotism”. Historically, of course, this is just a silly and self-serving imagination. —————————————————————————————————————————————- Enlightenment Christian Humanism and Enlightenment, in one way or another, redirected the view on humans and society from a theological determination –however theoretic- to a variety of reasoning and imagination. An increasing spectrum of philosophies, arts, sciences and practices emerged, in which theology was but one of many disciplines. Again, there can be only a rough overview with a special focus. The role of Islam in the emergence of this was largely omitted and forgotten, Islamic theology could not take place in Christian Europe as no Muslims had been allowed to survive. A Jewish one survived in some niches mainly in Eastern Europe (especially Poland-Lithuania). Both took place in the Ottoman realm. However, the Islamic “Counter-Enlightenment” had largely ended the development of sciences, while a quite efficient state centralism inhibited the development of alternatives. Nonetheless, as far as religious tolerance and pluralism was concerned, European thinkers had to point to the Ottoman sphere, wether Rousseau or Voltaire, Lessing or Goethe, or the English Deists. There the example was given that it was possible. Secularism in the meaning of respecting different beliefs and an autonomous sphere of theologies did not emerge directly from Islam, but was hardly thinkable without. The other side of the coin was autonomy of state and law from religion. Quite necessarily, it had to act anticlerical. Insofar, there was no room for Islamic rule, too. With respect to the state, it tended to support absolutism. As to society, the language was detected as a unifying factor defining political bodies, leading to nationalisms. This, together with liberalism, became the ideology of the emerging bourgeoisies. The Ottoman system had already an absolutism of sort, expressed in a sultanic prerogative and law. As well as Christian absolutisms, however, they remained allied with religion as the major source of law and conduct. Due to special circumstances, the sultanic prerogative about the lifes and properties of his servants inhibited the emergence of a Muslim, but not of a Christian and Jewish bourgeoisy. Growing predominance of West European economies further enhanced Christian economic dominance in the Ottoman Empire, all the more as any activity of Muslims in the West was nearly impossible; European antiislamism had remained largely intact in practice since the Middle Ages, despite Enlighteners and a few exceptions, like Venice. Quite the contrary: Humanism and Enlightenment, by rediscovering the heritage of the Antique, were deploring the “loss” of the “Greek World” to Muslim rule and in consequence a secular crusader movement under the flag of “Philhellenism” emerged. It wouldn’t be impossible to imagine Valery Giscard d’Estaing as one of its most prominent stakeholders today. A major handicap of the Ottomans in dealing with the problem was certainly the predominance of Islam in state law and bureaucracy, reinforced at times by a respective Islamic populism. Especially in its populist form, the “No novelties!” paradigm of Sunnitic conservatism was certainly a strong factor slowing down necessary adaptations. Whereas the Ottomans in fact accomodated to the major developments, including equality of their subjects, constitutional monarchy, industrialization, public education a.s.o., they finally succumbed to the emerging nationalisms supported by Western movements and Russia. In fact, conservative and even many liberal governments supported the OE in order to prevent Russian expansion to the Mediterranean; however, both Christian and “Enlightened” neo-crusaders in effect supported Russia. The latter proceeded by several ideologies, first pan-Orthodoxy, then pan-Slawism, some pan-Christianism (regarding especially Armenians and Georgians), and finally Marxism-Leninism – and, of course, military aggression. In the larger West, those with an idea of geopolitics opposed the Russian expansion and, up to now, succeeded repeatedly, if only by a hair’s breadth. Many of those with no idea of geopolitics in effect supported Russian advance and continue to do so. And their unifying ideology is still antiislamism. Ironically, it were “nationalisms” that succeeded the Ottoman Empire by means of Russian military victories and with support from Western sources. None of these nationalisms is known to have been supported by a majority of the respective “nations” prior to the establishment of an independent state by foreign powers. While expanding, each new territory had to be ethnically cleansed in order to make the attempted nation reasonably apparent; then, languages, architecture, and history were cleansed as well. Lastly Titoism, which L. Carl Brown, in 1996, proposed to understand as a neo-Ottoman pluralism rather than Communism, failed, crushed under nationalism and antiislamism while all the Europeans stood by and looked at and shackled their heads about: Nay, those Balkan barbarians! And indeed, how could they, who never had looked into a mirror, recognize their own heritage, or rather their identity? A heritage we can hardly be happy with. the end Still, we cannot draw the geographical borders of Enlightenment, Humanism, or “Jewo”-Christianity. Obviously, they cross through countries, they even cross individual brains. The only way to draw reasonable geographical borders is by geographical methods. Otherwise, we sort people, not space. Necessarily, we’ll come back to that issue. Some stuff for further reading: ADANIR, Fikret (1998): The Ottoman peasantries, c. 1360 – c. 1860. – 269-310 in: SCOTT, T. (ed.): The peasantries of Europe. From the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. – 416 S., London (Longman) ADANIR, Fikret (2001): Das Osmanische Reich als orientalische Despotie in der Wahrnehmung des Westens. – 83-121 in: KÜRSAT-AHLERS, E., TAN, D. & H.-P. WALDHOFF (Hrsg.): Türkei und Europa. Facetten einer Beziehung in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. – 235 S., Frankfurt am Main (IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation) ADANIR, Fikret (2003): Religious communities and ethnic groups under imperial sway: Ottoman and Habsburg lands in comparison. – 54-86 in: HOERDER, D., HARZIG, C. & A. SHUBERT (eds.): The historical practice of diversity. – 278 S., Oxfort, New York (Berghahn) AKSAN, Virginia H. (1999): Locating the Ottomans among early modern empires. – Journal of Early Modern History 3 (2): 103-134. Leiden. AYDIN, Mahmut (2001): Religious pluralism: A challenge for Muslims – A theological evaluation. – Journal of Ecumenical Studies 38: 330-352. Philadelphia, Pa. DARLING, Linda T. (2002): Another look at periodization in Ottoman history. – The Turkish Studies Association Journal 26 (2): 19-28. Bloomington, Indiana. DAVID, G. (2001): Limitations of conversion: Muslims and Christians in the Balkans in the sixteenth century. – 149-156 in: ANDOR, E. & I.G. TOTH (eds.): Frontiers of faith. Religious exchange and the constitution of religious identities 1400-1750. – 295 S., Budapest (Central European University/European Science Foundation) FAROQHI, Suraiya (1978): The early history of the Balkan fairs. – Südost-Forschungen 37: 50-68. München. FAROQHI, Suraiya (1997): Vom Sklavenmädchen zur Mekkapilgerin. Lebensläufe Bursaer Frauen im späten fünfzehnten Jahrhundert. – 7-29 in: KREISER, K. & C.K. NEUMANN (Hrsg.): Das Osmanische Reich in seinen Archivalien und Chroniken. Neyat Göyünc zu Ehren. – 327 S., Istanbul, Stuttgart (Franz Steiner Verlag) FISCHER-GALATI, Stephen A. (1959): Ottoman imperialism and German protestantism 1521-1655. – 140 S., Cambridge, Massachusetts (Harvard University Press), London (Oxford University Press) FODOR, P. (2001): The Ottomans and their Christians in Hungary. – 137-147 in: ANDOR, E. & I.G. TOTH (eds.): Frontiers of faith. Religious exchange and the constitution of religious identities 1400-1750. – 295 S., Budapest (Central European University/European Science Foundation) GÖCEK, Fatma Müge (1996): Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire. – 220 S., New York, N.Y. (Oxford University Press) GÖCEK, Fatma Müge (2002): Decline of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab nationalism. – 15-83 in: GÖCEK, F.M. (ed.): Social constructions of nationalism in the Middle East. – 279 S., Albany (State University of New York Press) GOFFMAN, Daniel (2002): The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. – 273 S.. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press; New approaches to Europen History 24) GROTHAUS, Maximilian (2002): Vom Erbfeind zum Exoten: Kollektive Mentalitäten über die Türken in der Habsburger Monarchie der frühen Neuzeit: 99-113 in: FEIGL, Inanc, HEUBERGER, Valeria, PITTIONI, Manfred & Kerstin TOMENENDAL (Hrsg.): Auf den Spuren der Osmanen in der österreichischen Geschichte. 179 S., Frankfurt am Main u.a. (Peter Lang, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften) GROTHUSEN, Klaus-Detlev (1979): Die Orientalische Frage als Problem der europäischen Geschichte: 79-96 in: GROTHUSEN, Klaus-Detlev (Hrsg.): Die Türkei in Europa. – 271 S, Göttingen (.Vandenhoek & Ruprecht) HÖFERT, Almut (2003): Ist das Böse schmutzig? Das Osmanische Reich in den Augen europäischer Reisender des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts. – Historische Anthropologie 11: 176-192. Köln, Weimar, Wien. ITZKOWITZ, Norman (1996): The problem of perceptions. – 30-38 in: BROWN, L. Carl (ed.): Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East. – 337 S., New York (Columbia University Press). KAFADAR, Cemal (1995): Between two worlds. The construction of the Ottoman state. – 221 S., Berkeley, Los Angeles, London (University of California Press) KASABA, Resat (2003): The Enlightenment, Greek civilization and the Ottoman empire: Reflections on Thomas Hope’s Anastasius. – Journal of Historical Sociology 16: 1-21. London. KIEL, Machiel (1983): The oldest monuments of Ottoman-Turkish architecture in the Balkans: the imaret and the mosque of Ghazi Evrenos Bey in Gümülcine (Komotini) and the Evrenos Bey Khan in the village of Ilica/Loutra in Greek Thrace (1370-1390). – Sanat Tarihi Yiligi – Kunsthistorische Forschungen 12: 117-138. Istanbul. KISSLING, Hans Joachim (1991): Osmanen und Europa. (Dissertationes orientales et balcanicae collectae ). – 253 S., München (Dr. Dr. Rudolf Trofenik) KITROMILIDES, Paschalis M. (1989): « Imagined Communities » and the origins of the National Question in the Balkans. – European History Quarterly 19: 149-192. London. KITROMILIDES, Paschalis M. (1990) : Greek irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus. – Middle Eastern Studies 26 (1): 3-17. Abingdon. KITROMILIDES, Paschalis M. (2003) : An Enlightenment perspective on Balkan cultural pluralism : the republican vision of Rhigas Velestinlis. – History of Political Thought 24 (3): 465-481. Thorverton. KITSIKIS, Dimitri (1985): L’Empire Ottoman. – 127 S. Paris (Presses Universitaires de France). KONTLER, L. (2001): „Mahometan Christianity“: Islam and the English Deists. – 107-119 in: ANDOR, E. & I.G. TOTH (eds.): Frontiers of faith. Religious exchange and the constitution of religious identities 1400-1750. – 295 S., Budapest (Central European University/European Science Foundation) KORTÜM, Hans-Henning (2003): Der Pilgerzug von 1064/65 ins Heilige Land. Eine Studie über Orientalismuskonstruktionen im 11. Jahrhundert. – Historische Zeitschrift 277: 561-592. München. KRAFT, E. (2003): Von der Rum Milleti zur Nationalkirche – die orthodoxe Kirche in Südosteuropa im Zeitalter des Nationalismus. – Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 51: 392-408. Stuttgart. KREISER, Klaus & Christoph E. NEUMANN (2002): Kleine Geschichte der Türkei. – 519 S., Stuttgart (Reclam) KULA, O.B. (2001): Zum Türkenbild im deutschen Schrifttum vom 11. bis 19. Jahrhundert. – 47-61 in: KÜRSAT-AHLERS, E., TAN, D. & H.-P. WALDHOFF (Hrsg.): Türkei und Europa. Facetten einer Beziehung in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. – 235 S., Frankfurt am Main (IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation) LOUIS, Herbert (1954): Über den geographischen Europabegriff. – Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft in München 39: 73-93. München. (On the geographic concept of Europe.) MAIER, L. (2003): Die Grenze zwischen dem Habsburgerreich und Bosnien um 1830. Von einem Versuch, eine friedlose Region zu befrieden. – Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 51: 379-391. Stuttgart. MÄRTIN, Ralf-Peter (1980): Dracula. Das Leben des Fürsten Vlad Tepes. – 189 S., Berlin (Wagenbach) McCARTHY, Justin (1996): Death and Exile. The ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922. – 368 S., Princeton, New Jersey (The Darwin Press). McCARTHY, Justin (2001): The Ottoman peoples and the end of empire. – 234 S., London, New York (Arnold Publishers; Oxford University Press) McCARTHY, Justin (2002): Population history of the Middle East and the Balkans. – 321 S., Istanbul (Isis Press) PALAIRET, Michael (1997): The Balkan economies c. 1800-1914. Evolution without development. – 415 S., Cambridge (Cambridge University Press). QUATAERT, Donald (2005): The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922. – 212 S., 2nd ed., Cambridge (Cambridge University Press; New approaches to European History 34). RANDHOFER, R. (1998): Antiochias Erbe. Die Gesänge der syro-antiochenischen Kirche. – Antike Welt 29: 311-324. Mainz. REHRMANN, M. (2003): A legendary place of encounter: The Convivenzia of Moors, Jews and Christians in medieval Spain. – 35-53 in: HOERDER, D., HARZIG, C. & A. SHUBERT (eds.): The historical practice of diversity. – 278 S., Oxfort, New York (Berghahn) ROTH, Harald (2003): Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens. – 2., durchges. Aufl., 199 S., Köln, Weimar, Wien (Böhlau). RUSINOW, Dennison (1996): The Ottoman legacy in Yugoslavia’s disintegration and civil war. – 78-99 in: BROWN L. Carl (ed.): Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East. – 337 S., New York (Columbia University Press). SAUER, Eberhard (2003): The archaeology of religious hatred in the Roman and Early Medieval world. – 192 S., Stroud, Gloucestershire and Charleston, North Carolina (Tempus) SAULNIER, Mine G. & Jacques JEULIN (2000): L’autre nom de la rose. Un regard turc sur la tragédie cathare et l’épopée de Cheikh Bedreddin. – 125 S., Paris (e-dite) SCHIMMEL, Annemarie (1995): West-östliche Annäherungen. – 132 S., Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln (W. Kohlhammer) STRAUSS, Johann (2002): Ottoman rule experienced and remembered: Remarks on some local Greek chronicles of the Tourkokratia. – 193-221 in: ADANIR, Fikret & Suraiya FAROQHI (eds.): The Ottomans and the Balkans. A discussion of historiography. – 445 S., Leiden, Boston, Köln (Koninklijke Brill NV) TODOROVA, Maria (1996): The Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. – 45-77 in: BROWN, L. Carl (ed.): Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East. – 337 S., New York (Columbia University Press). VAUGHAN, Dorothy M. (1954): Europe and the Turk. A pattern of alliances 1350-1700. – 305 S., Liverpool (University Press).