Time for a New Definition for Nationalism In Europe Islam is a concept that is being fabricated in people’s minds. This danger grows with people’s fears, politicians playing on these fears and provocations of the media. European intellectuals are people who comprehend Islam and its culture. A professor of religion said at a fast-breaking dinner that in Europe those from other religions were burned. In 1555 a decision was made that everyone could choose the religion in their own region. Burning left migration in its place.
In 1792 Madam de La Roque settled in Aachen with her mother. While escaping from the oppression of the French army, they eventually arrived in Bremen. She explains in her memoirs how the tolerance of Germans decreased in the North. A sign above the city gate in Aachen said “Jews and immigrants can’t stay.” The state of Westphalia was described as being more savage than civilized. A thinker and photographer I talked with in China said that before the revolution it was written “Dogs and Chinese cannot enter” on coffee-shop doors. I saw in his face what it meant to live like this in a city like Shanghai. In other words, just as Western racist ideology was practiced in Europe; it was perpetuated in every country under their exploitation, as well. I would suggest that everyone who says that Turkey is nationalistic should live in Europe. In Turkey during the Cold War, anyone could be gotten rid of by labeling them as a communist. It struck the freedom of universities the most. Now the Cold War is over. The Western world has chosen Islam as its enemy, but Turkey chose ‘political reaction.’ In every political period making the “other” a scapegoat only brings about destruction. It’s putting an embargo on the country’s future, tying up intelligence and letting the dogs loose. A blood stain is permanent. For that reason, it is essential to struggle against terror that murders the innocent. Outside of that, making a blood feud and going after the “other” does not unite a nation; it divides it. Turkey needs a homogeneous society more than ever. A body lives together with differences, but in agreement on homogeneous cultural values. Without a common base, you can’t put common goals. A Turkey without common goals will turn like an empty spinning wheel. Another German intellectual made this observation about Turkey: “When I first went to Konya, I never thought it would affect me this deeply. I’ve gone 30 times to date. Konya is called Turkey’s most conservative place. I don’t think so. Some of the Turks in Germany are very much behind Konya in culture. Without looking at the difference between villager and city dweller, they put everyone in the same basket due to Islam.” Europe is trying to take out on the “other” the pain of not being able to define its own identity. As long as Turkey doesn’t define its own identity, it will try and be superior to the “other,” but for nothing! Europe is a political, cultural region that has lived and is living in the most extreme state of nationalism. Because our culture is not racist, we can’t be that nationalistic. We need a new definition of nationalism. The creation of this definition requires a serious theoretical study, not coffee talk. This century is a period when developed countries are quickly becoming renewed and changing concepts. If Turkey becomes isolationist, it will remain beyond the world. This means it will become a dinosaur that continues to live in the Cold War period. If they hadn’t opposed this, where would Havel and his intellectual friends be today in the Czech Republic? We can’t advance by being enemies of Europe and America. We can’t escape mental atrophy. What’s important is not what they did, but what we didn’t do. The things we haven’t done and those who prevented us are our own cultural Great Wall of China. Those who don’t love their own culture and religion don’t love themselves. Does someone who doesn’t love himself have a future? He can be in power, but nothing else. There are those who appear to love, but they aren’t sincere. They are at least as dangerous as the other dinosaurs. Sincerity is possible with knowledge. Our forefathers said, “Instead of an ignorant friend, let me have an intelligent enemy.” Turkey should reject the freedom to be ignorant and pass over this threshold. We have to be able to open the road to knowledge, wisdom and sagacity. October 10, 2006 10.11.2006 Dear Nevval, you finished this comment (quoted below) with a saying that is customary in Germany since “time immemorial” (“better (to have) an intelligent foe than a silly friend”, or “he who has such friends doesn’t need enemies” – there are several variations of that motto). I didn’t know that it’s traditional in Turkey, too. A bit earlier you provoke the following question of mine: How do you know that something is your “own” culture or religion? And how to compel your neighbor to love it as well, or as much, as yourself? Nonetheless, I’m clear that you’re right insofar as Turkey needs to become a nation. There is an old definition of the nation that has nothing to do with what you may be used to understand with the term nationalism. The nation is the sovereign of a state and implies all its citizens. You certainly know that the Swiss nation, the oldest of the world since it dates back to the 13th to 14th century, has four official languages. Which means that all the connotations the term “nationalism” frequently is burdened with, are not essential. There is no need for a common language, religion, race or such. These are just weird and deplorable misunderstandings. The essential thing for a nation is to relate to the same common administration AND TO BE ITS SOVEREIGN. It means that the people are the master of the state, not the other way around. It means that the people among themselves are equal, that they are free as long as they don’t harm the freedom of the others; but they equally submit to a common law that they themselves establish through their parliament. This is the idea of a political “nation”. The people, through parties and other organizations, negotiate their nationhood. Which means, that laws and regulations are not imposed by a religious body, nor by a ruling bureaucracy. In Turkey, it’s still the late-Ottoman bureaucracy against the lower-ulema Islamism (which is basically a populist conservatism). Neither can create a nation, nor can they together create it. The nation may emerge when people take things in their own hands. This may be a gradual process, starting with economic and cultural activities. That’s why the recent “rose” and “orange” revolutions were highly symbolic: the people publicly declared that “We are the nation!” This is what a nation is all about. Of course, the political process is much more complicated. But the lack of a nation in this sense is also the most serious obstacle on Turkey’s way into the EU. As a feminist German journalist, who has quite some Turkish friends, quite rightly wrote, approximately: “The EU is the way to GATHER the democratic nations of Europe – it is not designed to MAKE them.” Meaning of course Turkey in first line. I differ from and in some sense disagree with her in that I think that the accession process should actively SUPPORT the emergence of a Turkish nation. But in fact, only the Turks themselves can actually make it. Good luck! Hans-Peter ps A critical aspect of Europe you may find discussed in the annex. It appeared recently on a French website. Next I intend to discuss geography in its relevant aspects. hp NEVVAL SEVINDI 10.13.2006 Friday – Time for a New Definition for Nationalism zaman In Europe Islam is a concept that is being fabricated in people’s minds. This danger grows with people’s fears, politicians playing on these fears and provocations of the media. European intellectuals are people who comprehend Islam and its culture. A professor of religion said at a fast-breaking dinner that in Europe those from other religions were burned. In 1555 a decision was made that everyone could choose the religion in their own region. Burning left migration in its place. In 1792 Madam de La Roque settled in Aachen with her mother. While escaping from the oppression of the French army, they eventually arrived in Bremen. She explains in her memoirs how the tolerance of Germans decreased in the North. A sign above the city gate in Aachen said “Jews and immigrants can’t stay.” The state of Westphalia was described as being more savage than civilized. A thinker and photographer I talked with in China said that before the revolution it was written “Dogs and Chinese cannot enter” on coffee-shop doors. I saw in his face what it meant to live like this in a city like Shanghai. In other words, just as Western racist ideology was practiced in Europe; it was perpetuated in every country under their exploitation, as well. I would suggest that everyone who says that Turkey is nationalistic should live in Europe. In Turkey during the Cold War, anyone could be gotten rid of by labeling them as a communist. It struck the freedom of universities the most. Now the Cold War is over. The Western world has chosen Islam as its enemy, but Turkey chose ‘political reaction.’ In every political period making the “other” a scapegoat only brings about destruction. It’s putting an embargo on the country’s future, tying up intelligence and letting the dogs loose. A blood stain is permanent. For that reason, it is essential to struggle against terror that murders the innocent. Outside of that, making a blood feud and going after the “other” does not unite a nation; it divides it. Turkey needs a homogeneous society more than ever. A body lives together with differences, but in agreement on homogeneous cultural values. Without a common base, you can’t put common goals. A Turkey without common goals will turn like an empty spinning wheel. Another German intellectual made this observation about Turkey: “When I first went to Konya, I never thought it would affect me this deeply. I’ve gone 30 times to date. Konya is called Turkey’s most conservative place. I don’t think so. Some of the Turks in Germany are very much behind Konya in culture. Without looking at the difference between villager and city dweller, they put everyone in the same basket due to Islam.” Europe is trying to take out on the “other” the pain of not being able to define its own identity. As long as Turkey doesn’t define its own identity, it will try and be superior to the “other,” but for nothing! Europe is a political, cultural region that has lived and is living in the most extreme state of nationalism. Because our culture is not racist, we can’t be that nationalistic. We need a new definition of nationalism. The creation of this definition requires a serious theoretical study, not coffee talk. This century is a period when developed countries are quickly becoming renewed and changing concepts. If Turkey becomes isolationist, it will remain beyond the world. This means it will become a dinosaur that continues to live in the Cold War period. If they hadn’t opposed this, where would Havel and his intellectual friends be today in the Czech Republic? We can’t advance by being enemies of Europe and America. We can’t escape mental atrophy. What’s important is not what they did, but what we didn’t do. The things we haven’t done and those who prevented us are our own cultural Great Wall of China. Those who don’t love their own culture and religion don’t love themselves. Does someone who doesn’t love himself have a future? He can be in power, but nothing else. There are those who appear to love, but they aren’t sincere. They are at least as dangerous as the other dinosaurs. Sincerity is possible with knowledge. Our forefathers said, “Instead of an ignorant friend, let me have an intelligent enemy.” Turkey should reject the freedom to be ignorant and pass over this threshold. We have to be able to open the road to knowledge, wisdom and sagacity. October 10, 2006 e-mail:n.sevindi@zaman.com.tr About the Identity of Europe and Why it is a Problem. Hans-Peter Geissen Certainly, we may assume that everybody who speaks about Europe knows that “Erep” is an ancient Syrian (Semitic) term meaning sunset, or west; and that its opposite is “Assu”, the sunrise, or east. It is therefore clear that Europe is not Asia, just as East is not West. Moreover, there is no difficulty to understand that the term means a direction on the surface of the earth and therefore is geographical. The difficulty lies in the fact that it is a relative term, depending on the viewpoint of the observer. From a North American viewpoint, for instance, Erep is what we commonly call Japan and China, and Assu may start in Iceland or France. But for orientation as to what may be meant in global terms we may take the ancient city of Assur, which is in today’s northern Iraq. The “Christian Club” It may then seem astonishing that quite a many of people claim that Europe’s identity would be harmed by a religion, Islam. Or that “the European Union must decide wether it is a Christian Club”, as Mr. Erdogan had put it some times ago. Religion is not a geographical term. Then, how can it determine or harm something geographical ? That seems quite nonsensical. Nevertheless, we may look at this from an empirical viewpoint and establish that here the term has been shifted from a geographical to a spiritual meaning. We cannot henceforth discuss the issue in geographic terms, and it would mean a serious confusion of mind were we to determine geographical borders of spirit. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe had it: “The Spirit blows wherever it wants.” Or not, as we might add. However, we might move to a common denominator of geography and human spirit, which we may find in history. It may reveal which spirit was blowing where, and even when. And still more. Of course, then, we must restrict ourselves to times when Christianity at least was in existence. In this sense, Cesar or Cicero, Socrates or Aristoteles, Vercingetorix or Armin(ius) were not European. And in fact, the term “European” was not in use in these times. It came into use in the Middle Ages, when indeed spiritual and geographical terms mingled. It is difficult for us today, to understand what exactly the term “Holy Roman Empire” meant. Perhaps, it would be wrong to search for accuracy in this context. But it is clear that “holy” is a spiritual term and “Rome” a geographical one. And “empire” relates to space, too, at least in effect. However, “European” did not just relate to that empire, which roughly contained what today is Germany and (north to central) Italy, and some neighboring regions. “Europe” in this sense contained France, Britain and (northern) Spain as well. “European” was a political term meaning those lands which provided warriors for crusades against the Muslims, then established in what was not “Europe”. The very term “crusade”, of course, related to the Christian cross, so we may guess that the spiritual meaning is quite obvious. “Europe”, then, is a bigger “Holy Empire”, or, in German, a “Reich”. Moreover, it is anti-Islamic by definition. But if we look at crusades in a broader context, they were, at times, also directed against the “pagans” in eastern regions of what then became “Europe”, and against the “heretic” Orthodox church. “Crusades” were also directed against deviant Western Christian groups like the Catharians, Albigensians, or Waldensians. We can, thus, not describe this Europe as simply Christian. It is more precisely Roman-Christian. The Problem We may then ask why this should be a problem today. Didn’t we have developments like Humanism and Enlightenment, which surpassed the boundaries of (Western) Christianity? Hadn’t already the Anglicans, the Lutherans and Calvinists, and finally the French Revolution succeeded in breaking free of Roman domination? Hadn’t the popes even been removed from Rome to Avignon and then, already in 1338, even been denied a role in the elevation of the “Holy Roman” emperor? Don’t we include Orthodox Christianity in Europe, relate our thinking to Aristotle and Cicero, or even mention a “Jewo”-Christian heritage? Aren’t we secularists today, isn’t even the Roman Church in favor of secularism? Yes. And yet, we inherited antiislamism. It is this inherited antiislamism that is motivating the fundamental-opposition against Turkey’s EU-accession, and it is in many of the more subtle forms of opposition or even of apparent approval. It may be fatal to underestimate the consequences. Spiritually, what is inherited here implicates the eradication of the evil. The physical appearance of the evil may be Albigensians, Iberian or Balkan Muslims, or witches, or wolves, or the “Jewish World Conspiracy”. Indeed, the “Third Reich” may be explicable best in terms of this heritage. We may ask wether Stalinism isn’t just another of its distant consequences, irrespective wether some historians call it “Asiatic”. Stalinism is about eradication of the (perceived) evil and is quite alien to any Asian culture, as far as my limited knowledge can reach. There are more subtle forms of this heritage. Despite we know well about the importance of Islamic societies in the Iberian peninsula and Sicily for the development of both European Humanism and Enlightenment, and we don’t bother to use Arabic numerals and Arabic terms like algebra and chemistry – “European History” ist mostly described as if it were without an Islamic heritage. But in fact, its development is not at all understandable without. Not without Islamic cultures and not without antiislamism. That is, we are dealing with an interaction, with synergistic and antagonistic aspects. This in turn is of course just one of many interactions that formed Europe, both on a European and global scale. But not something unimportant enough to omit. In fact, Islamic rule in Iberia tolerated large Christian and Jewish populations, and here it was that ancient Greek and other (Roman, Persian, Arabic) authors were translated from Arabic to West-European languages. Ironically, while “the evil” was eradicated in the Iberian peninsula, it expanded in the Balkan peninsula. And, still, in the Anatolian peninsula, where however it had started earlier. The Ottomans Ottoman expansion in the Balkans caused a flood of antiturkish and antiislamic propaganda that is an essential part of our “European Heritage”. The Ottoman proceedings in this conquest gave considerable reasons for deepest fears. First, they were militarily superior due to combined use of the disciplined (and quite Roman) Jannissary phalanx and Turkmenic light cavallery, superior logistics on campaign and in finance, and by the early use of cannons and musquets. Moreover, they allied with and co-opted Christian princes of the Balkan people, and finally the whole “Byzantine” (Orthodox) church. For the commoners, things depended on their geographic position. In the respective borderlands, they were subjected to the never-ending “Akinci” raids, which were among the reasonable grounds to name “the Turk” “terrible”. “He” indeed was. Which doesn’t mean that “Christian” raids into Ottoman lands were much different. Whatsoever, once inside the Ottoman Empire, the “Pax Ottomanica” had considerable advantages. Exploitation of the peasantry remained comparatively low and didn’t imply serfdom. Nor were they forced to change their religious creed. Even many of those who had been enslaved in Akinci raids could hope to be manumitted some years later and find acceptable conditions of life. However, in their case conversion to Islam was strongly advisable. Peasants and other commoners living further apart from Ottoman frontiers could compare the rumours coming in from the “Turkish empire”, relating to the absence of serfdom and of religious persecution for instance, with their current conditions. This in turn was probably reason enough to rain down as much defaming propaganda against “the Turk” on the boorish people as possible. Most efficiently from the church pulpits and at times in daily rhythm. Not much fantasy is needed to imagine why the effects may still be seen easily in Austria and Southern Germany, whereas they are much weaker in Northern Germany, or in Scandinavia. There were several political effects of Ottoman policies on European Christianity. First, they inherited from the Seljuks and other Islamic principalities the sympathy with the monophysite churches, especially the Armenian and Syrian, and their protection against the impositions of the Greek (Orthodox) church. Even more importantly, they first weakened but then protected the Orthodox themselves. Rather decisive for European history were their wars against Catholic Habsburg, without which the survival and establishing of Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism would in all probability not have been possible. And then we have the example of Transsylvania, which under Ottoman suzerainity saw the Orthodox, Lutherans, Catholics and Calvinists (and a few Armenians) live together quite peacefully. Which means that the first peaceful coexistence of the major European Christian denominations was possible under Ottoman rule, and only under Ottoman rule it was even thinkable. One should probably not underestimate the pedagogical effects on the whole of Europe. The autonomous principality of Transsylvania was at that time a major trade post between Central and Southeastern Europe, extending to Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands, Anatolia and the Balkans, the northern Black Sea region, even to Italy and Sweden. Unforeseen, or nearly so, here we are back in geography. Once again, admittedly. History is used here as a common denominator of the two. Spiritually, there were virtually no Muslims in this “second convivenzia”, and Jews were largely excluded from the public sphere. And nonetheless, it was again Muslim request that enabled coexistence of Christians. Next we will see that secular Christians still imagine that they developed secularism without the help of Muslims, and even against “Asiatic Despotism”. Historically, of course, this is just a silly and self-serving imagination. —————————————————————————————————————————————- Enlightenment Christian Humanism and Enlightenment, in one way or another, redirected the view on humans and society from a theological determination –however theoretic- to a variety of reasoning and imagination. An increasing spectrum of philosophies, arts, sciences and practices emerged, in which theology was but one of many disciplines. Again, there can be only a rough overview with a special focus. The role of Islam in the emergence of this was largely omitted and forgotten, Islamic theology could not take place in Christian Europe as no Muslims had been allowed to survive. A Jewish one survived in some niches mainly in Eastern Europe (especially Poland-Lithuania). Both took place in the Ottoman realm. However, the Islamic “Counter-Enlightenment” had largely ended the development of sciences, while a quite efficient state centralism inhibited the development of alternatives. Nonetheless, as far as religious tolerance and pluralism was concerned, European thinkers had to point to the Ottoman sphere, wether Rousseau or Voltaire, Lessing or Goethe, or the English Deists. There the example was given that it was possible. Secularism in the meaning of respecting different beliefs and an autonomous sphere of theologies did not emerge directly from Islam, but was hardly thinkable without. The other side of the coin was autonomy of state and law from religion. Quite necessarily, it had to act anticlerical. Insofar, there was no room for Islamic rule, too. With respect to the state, it tended to support absolutism. As to society, the language was detected as a unifying factor defining political bodies, leading to nationalisms. This, together with liberalism, became the ideology of the emerging bourgeoisies. The Ottoman system had already an absolutism of sort, expressed in a sultanic prerogative and law. As well as Christian absolutisms, however, they remained allied with religion as the major source of law and conduct. Due to special circumstances, the sultanic prerogative about the lifes and properties of his servants inhibited the emergence of a Muslim, but not of a Christian and Jewish bourgeoisy. Growing predominance of West European economies further enhanced Christian economic dominance in the Ottoman Empire, all the more as any activity of Muslims in the West was nearly impossible; European antiislamism had remained largely intact in practice since the Middle Ages, despite Enlighteners and a few exceptions, like Venice. Quite the contrary: Humanism and Enlightenment, by rediscovering the heritage of the Antique, were deploring the “loss” of the “Greek World” to Muslim rule and in consequence a secular crusader movement under the flag of “Philhellenism” emerged. It wouldn’t be impossible to imagine Valery Giscard d’Estaing as one of its most prominent stakeholders today. A major handicap of the Ottomans in dealing with the problem was certainly the predominance of Islam in state law and bureaucracy, reinforced at times by a respective Islamic populism. Especially in its populist form, the “No novelties!” paradigm of Sunnitic conservatism was certainly a strong factor slowing down necessary adaptations. Whereas the Ottomans in fact accomodated to the major developments, including equality of their subjects, constitutional monarchy, industrialization, public education a.s.o., they finally succumbed to the emerging nationalisms supported by Western movements and Russia. In fact, conservative and even many liberal governments supported the OE in order to prevent Russian expansion to the Mediterranean; however, both Christian and “Enlightened” neo-crusaders in effect supported Russia. The latter proceeded by several ideologies, first pan-Orthodoxy, then pan-Slawism, some pan-Christianism (regarding especially Armenians and Georgians), and finally Marxism-Leninism – and, of course, military aggression. In the larger West, those with an idea of geopolitics opposed the Russian expansion and, up to now, succeeded repeatedly, if only by a hair’s breadth. Many of those with no idea of geopolitics in effect supported Russian advance and continue to do so. And their unifying ideology is still antiislamism. Ironically, it were “nationalisms” that succeeded the Ottoman Empire by means of Russian military victories and with support from Western sources. None of these nationalisms is known to have been supported by a majority of the respective “nations” prior to the establishment of an independent state by foreign powers. While expanding, each new territory had to be ethnically cleansed in order to make the attempted nation reasonably apparent; then, languages, architecture, and history were cleansed as well. Lastly Titoism, which L. Carl Brown, in 1996, proposed to understand as a neo-Ottoman pluralism rather than Communism, failed, crushed under nationalism and antiislamism while all the Europeans stood by and looked at and shackled their heads about: Nay, those Balkan barbarians! And indeed, how could they, who never had looked into a mirror, recognize their own heritage, or rather their identity? A heritage we can hardly be happy with. the end Still, we cannot draw the geographical borders of Enlightenment, Humanism, or “Jewo”-Christianity. Obviously, they cross through countries, they even cross individual brains. The only way to draw reasonable geographical borders is by geographical methods. Otherwise, we sort people, not space. Necessarily, we’ll come back to that issue. Some stuff for further reading: ADANIR, Fikret (1998): The Ottoman peasantries, c. 1360 – c. 1860. – 269-310 in: SCOTT, T. (ed.): The peasantries of Europe. From the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. – 416 S., London (Longman) ADANIR, Fikret (2001): Das Osmanische Reich als orientalische Despotie in der Wahrnehmung des Westens. – 83-121 in: KÜRSAT-AHLERS, E., TAN, D. & H.-P. WALDHOFF (Hrsg.): Türkei und Europa. Facetten einer Beziehung in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. – 235 S., Frankfurt am Main (IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation) ADANIR, Fikret (2003): Religious communities and ethnic groups under imperial sway: Ottoman and Habsburg lands in comparison. – 54-86 in: HOERDER, D., HARZIG, C. & A. SHUBERT (eds.): The historical practice of diversity. – 278 S., Oxfort, New York (Berghahn) AKSAN, Virginia H. (1999): Locating the Ottomans among early modern empires. – Journal of Early Modern History 3 (2): 103-134. Leiden. AYDIN, Mahmut (2001): Religious pluralism: A challenge for Muslims – A theological evaluation. – Journal of Ecumenical Studies 38: 330-352. Philadelphia, Pa. DARLING, Linda T. (2002): Another look at periodization in Ottoman history. – The Turkish Studies Association Journal 26 (2): 19-28. Bloomington, Indiana. DAVID, G. (2001): Limitations of conversion: Muslims and Christians in the Balkans in the sixteenth century. – 149-156 in: ANDOR, E. & I.G. TOTH (eds.): Frontiers of faith. Religious exchange and the constitution of religious identities 1400-1750. – 295 S., Budapest (Central European University/European Science Foundation) FAROQHI, Suraiya (1978): The early history of the Balkan fairs. – Südost-Forschungen 37: 50-68. München. FAROQHI, Suraiya (1997): Vom Sklavenmädchen zur Mekkapilgerin. Lebensläufe Bursaer Frauen im späten fünfzehnten Jahrhundert. – 7-29 in: KREISER, K. & C.K. NEUMANN (Hrsg.): Das Osmanische Reich in seinen Archivalien und Chroniken. Neyat Göyünc zu Ehren. – 327 S., Istanbul, Stuttgart (Franz Steiner Verlag) FISCHER-GALATI, Stephen A. (1959): Ottoman imperialism and German protestantism 1521-1655. – 140 S., Cambridge, Massachusetts (Harvard University Press), London (Oxford University Press) FODOR, P. (2001): The Ottomans and their Christians in Hungary. – 137-147 in: ANDOR, E. & I.G. TOTH (eds.): Frontiers of faith. Religious exchange and the constitution of religious identities 1400-1750. – 295 S., Budapest (Central European University/European Science Foundation) GÖCEK, Fatma Müge (1996): Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire. – 220 S., New York, N.Y. (Oxford University Press) GÖCEK, Fatma Müge (2002): Decline of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab nationalism. – 15-83 in: GÖCEK, F.M. (ed.): Social constructions of nationalism in the Middle East. – 279 S., Albany (State University of New York Press) GOFFMAN, Daniel (2002): The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. – 273 S.. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press; New approaches to Europen History 24) GROTHAUS, Maximilian (2002): Vom Erbfeind zum Exoten: Kollektive Mentalitäten über die Türken in der Habsburger Monarchie der frühen Neuzeit: 99-113 in: FEIGL, Inanc, HEUBERGER, Valeria, PITTIONI, Manfred & Kerstin TOMENENDAL (Hrsg.): Auf den Spuren der Osmanen in der österreichischen Geschichte. 179 S., Frankfurt am Main u.a. (Peter Lang, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften) GROTHUSEN, Klaus-Detlev (1979): Die Orientalische Frage als Problem der europäischen Geschichte: 79-96 in: GROTHUSEN, Klaus-Detlev (Hrsg.): Die Türkei in Europa. – 271 S, Göttingen (.Vandenhoek & Ruprecht) HÖFERT, Almut (2003): Ist das Böse schmutzig? Das Osmanische Reich in den Augen europäischer Reisender des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts. – Historische Anthropologie 11: 176-192. Köln, Weimar, Wien. ITZKOWITZ, Norman (1996): The problem of perceptions. – 30-38 in: BROWN, L. Carl (ed.): Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East. – 337 S., New York (Columbia University Press). KAFADAR, Cemal (1995): Between two worlds. The construction of the Ottoman state. – 221 S., Berkeley, Los Angeles, London (University of California Press) KASABA, Resat (2003): The Enlightenment, Greek civilization and the Ottoman empire: Reflections on Thomas Hope’s Anastasius. – Journal of Historical Sociology 16: 1-21. London. KIEL, Machiel (1983): The oldest monuments of Ottoman-Turkish architecture in the Balkans: the imaret and the mosque of Ghazi Evrenos Bey in Gümülcine (Komotini) and the Evrenos Bey Khan in the village of Ilica/Loutra in Greek Thrace (1370-1390). – Sanat Tarihi Yiligi – Kunsthistorische Forschungen 12: 117-138. Istanbul. KISSLING, Hans Joachim (1991): Osmanen und Europa. (Dissertationes orientales et balcanicae collectae ). – 253 S., München (Dr. Dr. Rudolf Trofenik) KITROMILIDES, Paschalis M. (1989): « Imagined Communities » and the origins of the National Question in the Balkans. – European History Quarterly 19: 149-192. London. KITROMILIDES, Paschalis M. (1990) : Greek irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus. – Middle Eastern Studies 26 (1): 3-17. Abingdon. KITROMILIDES, Paschalis M. (2003) : An Enlightenment perspective on Balkan cultural pluralism : the republican vision of Rhigas Velestinlis. – History of Political Thought 24 (3): 465-481. Thorverton. KITSIKIS, Dimitri (1985): L’Empire Ottoman. – 127 S. Paris (Presses Universitaires de France). KONTLER, L. (2001): „Mahometan Christianity“: Islam and the English Deists. – 107-119 in: ANDOR, E. & I.G. TOTH (eds.): Frontiers of faith. Religious exchange and the constitution of religious identities 1400-1750. – 295 S., Budapest (Central European University/European Science Foundation) KORTÜM, Hans-Henning (2003): Der Pilgerzug von 1064/65 ins Heilige Land. Eine Studie über Orientalismuskonstruktionen im 11. Jahrhundert. – Historische Zeitschrift 277: 561-592. München. KRAFT, E. (2003): Von der Rum Milleti zur Nationalkirche – die orthodoxe Kirche in Südosteuropa im Zeitalter des Nationalismus. – Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 51: 392-408. Stuttgart. KREISER, Klaus & Christoph E. NEUMANN (2002): Kleine Geschichte der Türkei. – 519 S., Stuttgart (Reclam) KULA, O.B. (2001): Zum Türkenbild im deutschen Schrifttum vom 11. bis 19. Jahrhundert. – 47-61 in: KÜRSAT-AHLERS, E., TAN, D. & H.-P. WALDHOFF (Hrsg.): Türkei und Europa. 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